不同补贴对象下闭环供应链信息共享价值研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级闭环供应链中,为研究政府补贴下供应链需求信息共享对决策的影响及共享价值,针对两种补贴对象,构建并求解无信息共享和信息共享博弈模型,并进行仿真验证.研究表明:1)两种补贴对象下,制造商均能从信息共享中获益,零售商仅在绿色成本和回收成本较低时才会从信息共享中获益;绿色成本和回收成本稍高时,设计基于谈判势力的信息补偿机制能有效促进零售商共享信息.2)产品绿色度和回收率随预测需求量的提高而提高,批发价和零售价仅在回收成本较低时,才会随预测需求量的提高而提高.3)在仅补贴一方情况下,当补贴对象为低补贴一方时,两个主体所获的信息共享价值大;若对两者的补贴均较低,两个主体均希望补贴对象为零售商;若对两者的补贴均较高,零售商不愿共享需求信息.     

基于供应方生产能力的应急物资生产模型

利用期权契约所建立的政企合作储备应急物资模式能够有效解决政府单独储备模式所造成的物资储备量过少或过多而引起的困境。然而由于应急物资的需求特性,若应急物资供应企业采用按单生产方式安排生产储备计划,势必会造成库存水平升高,引发资金周转困难等问题,对政企之间的长期合作造成不利影响。基于此,本文设计了基于供应方生产能力的应急物资生产模型。该模型在政府利用批发价格契约与期权契约采购应急物资的基础上,研究了供应方根据自身生产能力进行柔性生产时的生产与储备问题。通过推导政企双方最优决策后,重点分析了期权权利金,执行价格,加急生产成本等参数对供应方生产决策的影响,并证明与按单生产模式相比,柔性生产模式可有效降低供应方的库存量与生产成本,提高其利润,继而提高整体供应链的利润水平,有助于促进政企之间长期稳定的合作。     

An optimal co-reinsurance strategy

This article considers a co-reinsurance strategy that (1) protects insurance companies against catastrophic risks; (2) enables insurers to gather sufficient information about the different risk attitudes of reinsurers and diversify their reinsured risks; (3) enables insurers to create better risk-sharing profiles by balancing the risk tolerances of reinsurers; (4) has the benefit of allowing reinsurers to accumulate experience with risks with which they are unfamiliar; (5) reduces the overall direct cost of a reinsurance contract; (6) allows a government to back some insurance products, such as the terrorism insurance programs that were established in many countries after the September 11th terrorist attacks; and (7) reflects the practical reinsurance industry of some countries, such as Iran. Such a co-reinsurance strategy can be fully determined by estimating its parameters whenever three optimal criteria are satisfied and prior information about the unknown parameters is available. Two simulation-based studies have been conducted to demonstrate (1) the practical applications of our findings and (2) the possible impact of any type of dependency between the co-reinsurance’s parameters and the evaluated optimal co-reinsurance strategy.     

手机广告链中移动运营商的努力动机研究与仿真

建立了由单手机广告主、手机广告代理商和移动运营商构成的三级广告产业链之间的基于协作的收益共享契约模型,分析了在以移动运营商为主导的手机广告链中,移动运营商的努力动机受收益共享和努力成本补偿参数的影响.采用量化分析和模拟仿真结合的方法,得出契约参数只有在满足一定条件下,移动运营商所做出的最优努力水平投入决策,将使得整个手机产业链收益最大化,实现多方共赢.     

Inside the Solvency 2 Black Box: Net Asset Values and Solvency Capital Requirements with a least-squares Monte-Carlo approach

The calculation of Net Asset Values and Solvency Capital Requirements in a Solvency 2 context–and the derivation of sensitivity analyses with respect to the main financial and actuarial risk drivers–is a complex procedure at the level of a real company, where it is illusory to be able to rely on closed-form formulas. The most general approach to performing these computations is that of nested simulations. However, this method is also hardly realistic because of its huge computation resources demand. The least-squares Monte Carlo method has recently been suggested as a way to overcome these difficulties. The present paper confirms that using this method is indeed relevant for Solvency 2 computations at the level of a company.     

澳门博采收入增长影响因素分析

通过对2005年1月至2013年7月份的澳门博采毛收入数据进行季节分析,显示澳门博采毛收入有显著的中国节假日特征.其次分析入境澳门旅客数、酒店住客数、劳动力参与率、消费指数以及突发事件是否是澳门博采毛收入迅速增长的原因,通过计量经济学分析,得到酒店住客数、劳动力参与率、中国的节假日三个因素对澳门博采毛收入有显著的正向影响关系,而2008年世界金融危机对博采毛收入有显著的负的影响.最后结合实际给出了提高博采收入的政策建议.     

On the Bullwhip Avoidance Phase: The Synchronised Supply Chain

The aim of this paper is to analyse the operational response of a Synchronised Supply Chain (SSC). To do so, first a new mathematical model of a SSC is presented. An exhaustive Latin Square design of experiments is adopted in order to perform a boundary variation analysis of the main three parameters of the periodic review smoothing (S, R) order-up-to policy: i.e., lead time, demand smoothing forecasting factor, and proportional controller of the replenishment rule. The model is then evaluated under a variety of performance measures based on internal process benefits and customer benefits. The main results of the analysis are: (I) SSC responds to violent changes in demand by resolving bullwhip effect and by creating stability in inventories under different parameter settings and (II) in a SSC, long production–distribution lead times could significantly affect customer service level. Both results have important consequences for the design and operation of supply chains.     

Contract type and decision right of sales promotion in supply chain management with a capital constrained retailer

From the practices of Chinese consumer electronics market, we find there are two key issues in supply chain management: The first issue is the contract type of either wholesale price contracts or consignment contracts with revenue sharing, and the second issue is the decision right of sales promotion (such as advertising, on-site shopping assistance, rebates, and post-sales service) owned by either manufacturers or retailers. We model a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who has limited capital and faces deterministic demand depending on retail price and sales promotion. The two issues interact with each other. We show that only the combination (called as chain business mode) of a consignment contract with the manufacturer’s right of sales promotion or a wholesale price contract with the retailer’s right of sales promotion is better for both members. Moreover, the latter chain business mode is realized only when the retailer has more power in the chain and has enough capital, otherwise the former one is realized. But which one is preferred by customers? We find that the former is preferred by customers who mainly enjoy low price, while the latter is preferred by those who enjoy high sales promotion level.     

Allocating fixed costs and common revenue via data envelopment analysis

An issue of considerable importance involves the allocation of fixed costs or common revenue among a set of competing entities in an equitable way. Based on the data envelopment analysis (DEA) theory, this paper proposes new methods for (i) allocating fixed costs to decision making units (DMUs) and (ii) distributing common revenue among DMUs, in such a way that the relative efficiencies of all DMUs remain unchanged and the allocations should reflect the relative efficiencies and the input-output scales of individual DMUs. To illustrate our methods, numerical results for an example are described in this paper.     

The impact of sharing customer returns information in a supply chain with and without a buyback policy

In this paper, we examine a single period problem in a supply chain in which a Stackelberg manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer who faces customer returns and demand uncertainty. We show that the manufacturer incurs a significant profit loss with and without a buyback policy if it fails to account for customer returns in the wholesale price decision. Under the assumption that the retailer is better informed than the manufacturer on customer returns information, we show that without a buyback policy, the retailer prefers not to share if the manufacturer overestimates while it prefers to share customer returns information if the manufacturer underestimates this information. If the manufacturer offers a buyback policy, we have the opposite results. We also discuss incentives to share the customer returns information and some of the issues that are raised in sharing this information.